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Medical Services LLC. V. Russo (2020) 
Directed by Dr. Nancy Myers. 28 pp. 
 Examining the US Supreme Court case June Medical Services LLC V. Russo, I 
draw on the complicated trajectory of Louisiana law and Alexander Weheliye’s 
theorization of the assemblage of the nonhuman to argue that Black women in Louisiana 
face particular legal barriers and forms of criminalization that speak to a longer history of 
rendering Black women’s bodies as simultaneously invisible and hypervisible. By 
emphasizing the impossibility of a Black female subject in the legal imaginary, I critique 
the positioning of Act 620, a law that would refuse abortion providers to practice without 
having admitting privileges to a hospital within thirty miles of the location of the 
procedure, which would result in the reduction of abortion providers in Louisiana to only 
one. I use the historical and contemporary legal legacy of the state to enact rhetorical 
practices of invisibility and hypervisibility to both criminalize Black women as well as 
refuse or create obstacles to a multitude of social services. I highlight how the particular 
Russo Supreme Court case is part of a larger trajectory and history of refusing Black 
women legal subjecthood through individualist and paternalist rhetoric, which both 
shapes and takes place in law and its enforcement.
CARTER, MORGAN ELLEN, M.A. “Will You Test Your Strength Out on Me?”: Comic 
Disruptions and the Rhetorical Memoir. (2020) 
Directed by Dr. Heather Adams. 24 pp. 
 I look at six pieces by comedians, three stand-up specials and three memoirs, to 
examine comedy as a form of rhetorical response that emerges from a situation that is 
rooted in personal, embodied experience. I critique Lloyd F. Bitzer’s and Richard E. 
Vatz’s oppositional writing on the rhetorical situation and its being rooted in either a 
distant, generalized event or the language used to articulate such an event as the primary 
factors in eliciting a response. Instead, I privilege Jacqueline Jones Royster’s intervention 
on the tension between “subject matter” and “subjectivity” as well as Sarah Ahmed’s 
work on phenomenology to assert that when bodies that make up and are directly 
implicated in events or situations become those that speak on and address them, another 
form of rhetorical agency is possible. Looking at comedians who are women of color 
and/or queer, I illustrate how stand-up comedy, when performed by Other bodies, is an 
accessible and strategic means of persuasion as well as enacting change on both a 
personal and social level. 
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UNDUE BURDENS: THE BLACK WOMAN SUBJECT IN JUNE MEDICAL 
SERVICES V. RUSSO 
 
We might concede, at the very least, that sticks and bricks might break our bones, 
but words will most certainly kill us.  
 Hortense J. Spillers, “Mama’s Baby, Papa’s Maybe” 
Introduction 
 On October 4, 2019, it was announced that June Medical Services LLC filed a 
lawsuit against the state of Louisiana to challenge the constitutionality of a new law that 
would require doctors who provide abortions to have admitting privileges at a hospital 
within thirty miles of the site where the abortion is provided. Similar to the Texas Case of 
Whole Women’s Health v. Hellerstedt, the act would reduce the state’s already dismal 
three providers to only one. Passed in 2014, Act 620 was quickly challenged by abortion 
providers and reproductive justice advocates, with many arguing that the law would only 
create undue burden on those seeking abortions. With sixty-one percent of abortions 
performed on Black women, activist organizations such as Louisiana-based Women With 
A Vision (WWAV) and the Texas-based Afiya Center have positioned the law as a 
massive attack on bodily autonomy. With post-Katrina displacement and economic 
devastation, Black women in Louisiana face particular legal barriers and forms of 
criminalization that speak to a longer history of rendering Black women’s bodies as 
simultaneously invisible and hypervisible. Set to hear arguments on March 4, 2020, June
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Medical Services LLC v. Russo1 is only one of many abortion restrictions proposed across 
the country. However, the geographical and socio-economic implications of Act 620 are 
entangled with Louisiana’s peculiar judicial and legislative trajectory and its 
conceptualization, or lack thereof, of the Black female subject. By arguing that Black 
women are rendered simultaneously invisible and hypervisible, I mean that they are 
denied explicit legal recognition (or claim to legal personhood as property), signifying a 
particular lack in the legal imaginary; at the same time, they are subject to heavy policing 
and enforcement of more specific punishments and restrictions, which is made possible 
by that aforementioned lack. I refer to the legal imaginary as a space of consciousness 
that assumes a common set of values, norms, moral investments, and, of course, law that 
is not inseparable from material, lived experiences and effects. The former situation of 
invisibility makes possible the latter hypervisibility, as it makes possible the 
individualized practice and enforcement of law. Black women’s bodies have been placed 
on display thus are more prone to policing, criminalization, and imprisonment. This is 
possible due to the impossibility of a legal Black female subject. 
Although this process within the legal imaginary and its material effects might be 
said to be true of the United States in general, the distinctly varied and complex 
landscape of Louisiana law and legislature provides insight into what Pauli Murray 
coined as “Jane Crow,” which describes how two marginalized identities cannot be 
entered into or even conceptualized within the legal imaginary: in particular, the double-
 
1 Formerly June Medical Services LLC v. Gee. This change took place on February 6, 2020 after a staffing 
change at the Louisiana Department of Health.  
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marginalized identity of Black woman. This is demonstrated in  the immediate effects of 
coinciding invisibility and hypervisibility that Black women experienced during the 
height of the Crimes Against Nature by Solicitations (CANS) indictments in post-Katrina 
Louisiana: 
 
When invisible, no one saw the work Black women did, the violence they 
endured, and what it took to survive that violence every day. And when Black 
women were not seen, it was easy for them to be devalued, to never get the 
support they needed, to never get credit for work they did. But when hyper-
visible, those very same things that went unseen become reasons to stigmatize 
Black women—and identify them as objects of fear or further violence (Deon and 
Haywood 268). 
 
 
The socio-cultural process which allows the blame for acts of violence and neglect 
against Black women’s bodies to be deflected back onto those bodies is a frequent motif 
in the judicial and legislative history of Louisiana, a major slave port state with the 
largest number of free persons of color in the nineteenth century.  
The particular struggles and nuances regarding Black women and reproductive 
justice are not only nationwide but also global; attention to the US Supreme Court’s 
decision regarding Act 620 has been articulated as a national threat—one that could 
provoke a return and revision of Roe v. Wade. However, I focus on Louisiana’s Act 620 
as it speaks to and is influenced by a legal trajectory that is specific to the state in its 
(anti)construction of Black women as legal subjects. I take on the question of Black 
womanhood in the Louisiana legal imaginary. Rather than positioning Black women as 
merely constructed within and by intersectional matrices of power, I instead argue that 
they are rhetorical assemblages of the nonhuman. As such, the treatment here of law, 
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legislation, and courtroom practice is not as unbiased, static rules of agreed-upon 
governance or shared morality, but rather as living, constitutive, and material forms of 
rhetoric that represent sociopolitical dialogue pertaining to anxieties and/or perceived 
shared values. James Boyd White illustrates how law, legislation, and its practice are 
simultaneously a translational process as well as a narrative one. By understanding law as 
a form of rhetoric, we can begin to understand how “[…] it is at once both a social 
activity—a way of acting with others—and a cultural activity—a way of acting with a 
certain set of materials found in the culture” (691). In other words, by reading the law as 
both being influenced by as well as producing a sociopolitical discursive that exercises a 
type of biopower, it becomes less static, and, more importantly, less abstract. Law, and 
further, the legal imaginary, are constitutive phenomena.  
Louisiana Law as Rhetoric with Material Consequences for the Nonhuman 
 In the case of Act 620, the more immediate predicament is that of invisibility, 
which through its function is an indicator of hypervisibility. Invisibility, or the refusal to 
explicitly acknowledge or include Black women, not only as legal subjects but as rhetors, 
contributes to hypervisibility which results in increased involvement and subjection to the 
police, the carceral state, and the courtroom. For example, if Act 620 were to successfully 
shut down all but one clinic providing abortions2, the lack of access can and will result in 
seeking other options, including but not limited to illegal and unsafe termination 
methods. There is also the concern of the lack of emergency services wherein a 
 
2 On June 29, 2020, the Supreme Court ruled in favor of June Medical Services, holding to their previous 
Hellerstedt v. Whole Women’s Health reasoning. 
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termination is deemed necessary to save the mother’s life. In a state where the majority of 
those seeking abortions are rural Black women and the mortality rate for births is the 
highest in the country, legal and social personhood and, too often, livelihood, are refused. 
The state’s rhetorical move to situate doctors without admitting privileges as negligent or 
incompetent obfuscates the material, socio-economic stakes for Black women in the 
south, who would face an even more increased chance of indictment, imprisonment, 
and/or death.  
 This invisibility-hypervisibility legal context has real and lasting 
material/embodied consequences and conditions for Black women. However, the legal 
constructions and constrictions mark them as fluid, unstable rhetorical assemblages of 
race, gender, and class, which deprives women, more specifically Black (southern) 
women, of legal and rhetorical status and agency. It is the lack of attention to the 
gendered, raced, and classed intersections of identity in which Act 620 effectively renders 
invisible the needs and therefore personhood of Black women in the state. In turn, a 
hypervisibility is implicated that can include, but is not limited to, criminalization 
through the financial and practical barriers that result from a lack of access to 
reproductive care and abortion. Indeed, in their first writ of certiorari, June Medical 
Services LLC argues that the act creates undue burden, stating that, “Louisiana does not 
seriously dispute that, if certiorari is denied and Act 620 goes into effect, all but one 
clinic in Louisiana will close, and no physician will be left in the state who provides 
abortions after 17 weeks’ gestation” (7). Speaking to a larger historical dialogue around 
Black women and reproductive justice, Act 620 emphasizes the law as product and 
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producer of an imaginary that operate within and through racialized rhetorical 
assemblages through its rendering of the needs and status of Black women as illegible.  
 Through an exercise of biopolitical power, Black women become racialized 
rhetorical assemblages of the nonhuman in the legal imaginary. This assertion is based on 
three sub-assertions: 1) that race and gender, as articulated assemblages (always in 
relation to each other), are “sociopolitical processes” as opposed to cultural or biological 
classifications (Weheliye 4); 2) that juridical personhood is dispensed and refused 
through these articulated assemblages; and 3) that law/legislation/legal practice is 
influenced by and produces a rhetoric that is both material and imaginary. In other words, 
Black women’s active and relational properties of rhetorical assemblage produce their 
simultaneous hypervisibility and invisibility. Act 620 and the threat of restrictions to a 
group with a majority of Black women, along with legal and judicial reasoning in support 
of the act, is a contemporary example of how these assemblages implicate invisibility. 
Through the active and relational capacities of assemblage, Black women most affected 
by a provision that would incur both mobility and monetary drains would be primarily 
working-or-lower-class and rural. Due to these relational carriers which refuse them 
juridical personhood as articulated through property, Act 620 effectively erases these 
Black women as viable rhetorical agents. By asserting race and gender as sociopolitical 
assemblages, I am not asserting that these concepts of treatments of categorization are 
somehow ‘unreal.’ Rather, I intend to underscore the realm and the role of rhetoric, both 
individualized and social, in cultivating quite real, material effects on Black women’s 
bodies and status of juridical (non)personhood. Situating the institution and practice of 
 7 
law as both being influenced by and producing material rhetoric reiterates both Alexander 
G. Weheliye’s and Hortense J. Spiller’s attention to grammar and signification as a 
trajectory point in which to understand how something so seemingly abstract and 
intangible as language and rhetoric can have such realized material and embodied 
consequences.  
Concerns around the process by which the cultural and legal imaginary transforms 
to both erase as well as enact violence on bodies stems from critique of the 
conceptualization and treatment of race (and gender) as a ‘real object.’ The ‘real object’ 
position assumes race as a biological and scientific given/constant, forgetting or ignoring 
the way race is inscribed; or, as Weheliye writes, racialization “as a conglomerate of 
sociopolitical relations that discipline humanity into full humans, not-quite humans, and 
nonhumans” (4). Weheliye reworks and reframes Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari’s 
notion of assemblage, which asserts that relational components of social and embodied 
being and identification are neither stable nor fixed; rather they are active, displaceable, 
and replaceable upon one’s bodies and others. Expanding and reorienting this concept, 
Weheliye introduces racializing assemblages, wherein those three aforementioned 
classifications of (non)humanity are produced. Focusing on the relationality of those 
components as the driving force within which articulation is possible, Weheliye notes 
how, these articulations “produce and give expression to previously nonexistent realities, 
thoughts, bodies, affects, actions, idea, and so on” (46). As he asserts, canonized theories 
of bare life and biopolitics act as if racialization is transcend-able and therefore defer to 
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purely biological or cultural enunciation of the human, which results in a legal/legislative 
restriction of racialized subjects to an understanding of personhood-as-property.  
Spillers flags one means by which language and rhetoric work their way onto the 
Black woman’s body in the American grammar (symbolic) system. Spillers too rejects 
‘race-as-real-object,’ providing insight into the simultaneously embodied and symbolic 
process enacted in order to strip the Black body of any chance of being read as human. 
Spillers argues that “gendering” occurs in space of the domestic, a space which has 
historically been held at odds and at distant proximity from the Black body. Highlighting 
the “ungendering” which is necessary to occur in order to transform Black bodies into 
quantities, or property, as a premier function of the Middle Passage, Spillers shows how 
human cargo is defined in opposition to the domestic. However, the domestic is the space 
in which grammar is awarded and practiced through the concept of kinship. Because the 
slave and human cargo have not only been stripped of gender, but of kinship as well, in 
order to articulate these bodies instead through property relations, the privileges of 
grammar and names is necessarily refused. The juridical naming of “slave” as opposed to 
personal terminology of “man,” “woman,” “persons,” etc. emphasizes the refusal of 
subjecthood to Black bodies, while the stripping of kinship refuses a particular status 
within the confines of nationalism. Reproduction under the guise of slavery was not 
considered as a contribution towards morality and patriotic ties as a whole but as a 
contribution of capital for the individual slaveowner. 
However, Spiller’s target is the American grammatical and juridical predicament 
as a whole. Though it can be said that the Louisiana legislative trajectory has within their 
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Code Noir and slavery codes the juridical name of “slave,” there is also the presence of 
terms such as “free persons of color,” pointing to a larger population of bodies (mostly of 
Black descent, if at least partial) operating outside the legal definition of slave and 
property than the American legislative as a whole. It is important to note that though 
these bodies might be given a convenient name of “persons,” they are still not configured 
within the sphere of domesticity and, therefore, still refused juridical personhood or 
citizenship. This socio-political sub-subjectivity, coupled with the purely social practices 
of concubinage with free persons of color through local, cultural institutions such as 
‘quadroon balls’ in nineteenth century Louisiana, points to a different kind of early 
configuration of Black women in Louisiana wherein motherhood and maternity more 
explicitly serves or threatens white investments in and conceptualizations of family and 
kinship. As seen through certain legislative restrictions concerning Black women in 
Louisiana, such as the “tignon law,” region-specific concerns around Black women have 
centered on their threat to ‘proper,’ white family structures. The “tignon law,” which 
came into effect under Spanish rule of the Louisiana territory (1762-1803), took explicit 
concern with the appearance of Black women and warned against excess in dress and 
self-expression. Even more specifically, however, is the law’s particular preoccupation 
with a feature of the literal body by requiring Black women to cover their hair. Tignon, a 
Louisiana Creole word for “headwrap,” went on to signify not only how Louisiana law 
has and would continue to make Black women hypervisible by forcing them to literally 
cover up or remain at the margins, but also how Black women would respond to this 
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hypervisibility through a tradition of resistance whose trajectory is certainly equal to but 
might even reach further back than Louisiana and its legal imaginary.  
Act 620: The Question of Public Identity 
By framing Black women as rhetorical assemblages of the nonhuman in the 
Louisiana legal imaginary, June Medical Services LLC vs. Russo (Act 620) operates as an 
example of invisibility as enacted through Black women as [necessarily] nonhuman in a 
local legal imaginary (which is then projected onto a national stage). However, Black 
women as rhetorical assemblages of the nonhuman also highlightsthe responses and 
refusal of this process. For in June Medical Services LLC vs.Russo, the plaintiffs in 
question are the abortion providers and the community that benefits from their services. 
In their writ of certiorari, June Medical Services criticizes Louisiana’s lack of explicit or 
immediate benefits that Act 620 would provide, but the many obstacles it creates for 
those seeking treatment, arguing that this establishes undue burden on patients. The 
plaintiffs also argue that, like Texas’ Whole Women’s Health vs. Hellerstedt, Act 620 
attempts to place the burden on providers who cannot gain admitting privileges, an 
individualized process that varies with each hospital. Both of these arguments put forth 
by June Medical Services serves to exemplify the strategic invisibility of those seeking 
treatment the most: lower income Black women in rural areas. By implementing undue 
burden on these women (that is, by limiting their access through financial and locational 
barriers, but providing no actual benefit to their constitutional right to reproductive 
health), Act 620 does not only diminish the little resources in place, but directs the 
responsibility of these rights away from the government. As such, Black women are 
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rendered invisible in the legislation and the state’s debate on bodily autonomy, leading to 
not only the lack of access to safe reproductive care, but also redirects the resulting 
burden onto Black women. In their petition for writ of certiorari, June Medical Services 
does argue that the initial burden of credentials is placed on the providers. However, I 
contend that the results of Act 620’s passing—unwanted pregnancies, unsafe abortions, 
lack of reliable pre-and-post-natal care— absolutely is rhetorically figured as the fault 
and failure of Black women. Previous examples of this type of hypervisibility can be 
found in that prescriptive naming: the “Welfare Queen,” a public identity which in turn 
represents a cultural narrative.  
The “Welfare Queen as a public identity is, much like the majority of legislation 
with major impact of Black women, tied up with motherhood and the body. Angie-Marie 
Hancock notes how the “Welfare Queen” as an image becomes excessive: “Conflation of 
all welfare recipients with single, poor Black mothers largely reflects the supercession of 
inegalitarian traditions of race, gender, and class over the facts concerning the 
demographic characteristics of welfare recipients (23-24). Black women become the all-
encompassing signifier of the welfare recipient, and marital and motherhood status 
become proof of this. The Black-woman-as-problem becomes a prominent theme here. 
Specifically, her body and the way it takes up space. Hancock writes, “The “welfare 
queen” public identity has two organizing dimensions: hyperfertility and laziness” (25). 
In this particular situation, the Black woman is immobile but takes up space and threatens 
economy through reproduction. Hancock illustrates how public image functions beyond 
an imaginary, to legitimize the legal and political subjugation of Black women. Using 
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Patricia Hill-Collins concept of “controlling images,” Hancock argues that the “welfare 
queen” was an image borne out of response to and in order to control the growing 
political organization of single, poor African American mothers. Hancock shows us how 
the welfare program of the United States, from its conception, has a strong relationship 
with motherhood: the context of a rise in both American nationalism and maternalism in 
the Victorian social consciousness fueled the program. A national example, the “welfare 
queen” can also have localized identity-based differences: the local image of the “welfare 
queen” in central West Virginia, a rural area with a low population of people of color, 
might be white; however, the assumption is that she is a mother. On the other hand, 
Louisiana, with a much larger population of Black women might find the image of single 
Black motherhood inextricably tied with the image of the “welfare queen. What is 
important to note is Hancock overall emphasizes that motherhood and maternity are 
central to the image and that race and racialization, however contingent, play an 
important role in not only the national social imaginary, but the national legal imaginary 
as well. 
 Like Act 620 and its trajectory, the “welfare queen” image and the legislative and 
political discourses that drove it were clearly bound to the social imagination and the 
rhetoric it produced. The variations in rulings, along with the precarity of individualized 
determination and policing, underscore how the legal imaginary is at once both a national 
and local location with effects on individual bodies that make up a significant percent of 
an already at-risk population. The status of Black women’s visibility cannot be 
undermined in its role of naming and implicating their bodies as not only risky or 
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threatening, but also criminal. Both hypervisibility and invisibility are key techniques 
where the contingency of personhood is a question of where, when, and how Black 
women are or are not seen. What makes them visible or invisible are rhetorical moves 
that create and are created by a social imaginary.  
The “Welfare Queen” unlike the “tignon law,” is a national situation rather than 
localized one specific to Louisiana. Its example shows us that Louisiana’s legal 
imaginary and rhetorical action are not unique, but  act as an extension of a larger 
national imaginary that holds an investment in the subjugation of Black women. What is 
peculiar about Louisiana and Act 620 in particular is how it is also an extension of a 
localized legal imaginary, wherein the subjugation of Black women rests in specific 
rhetorical techniques that continue to reappear. A national legal imaginary has a different 
approach to refusing legal status to Black women through erasure. The problem of Black 
motherhood from a national standpoint did not rest in the fault of Black women, but in 
the absence of the Black father, and as such, historically operates as a national effort to 
curb Black women’s procreation. In the mid-twentieth century, cases from (but not 
limited to) California3, Virginia, and North Carolina4 all reveal not only how hundreds of 
thousands of people were unknowingly or otherwise sterilized (with some, but not all of 
these cases being ruled legal), but that Black women were disproportionately more likely 
to be sterilized. This double-invisibility and victimization of Black women stands in stark 
contrast to Louisiana efforts, which rather hinges on the culpability of the Black woman 
 
3 See Buck v. Bell, which served to uphold Virginia (and by extension, California) sterilization laws. 
4 See Re Sterilization of Moore 
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as criminal and, therefore, attempts to make her known.  Hancock’s maternal focus on the 
“welfare queen” is coupled with marital status. Starting with the advocation for widow’s 
pensions, the loss of the father and/or husband became the threat which people rallied 
behind when pushing for more protections of motherhood. The argument that “every 
woman is one man away from welfare” illustrates a movement’s rhetorical response to 
both highlight the wide-ranging possibility of any mother needing welfare, but also to 
problematize the use of the single Black mother as the iconography of the “welfare 
queen” (39).  
Whereas the “welfare queen” and its legislative histories might be more 
concerned with the hypervisibility of the single Black mother as the ‘problem’ with the 
welfare system (through social and political rhetoric she became the “welfare queen” that 
exploited a social system), by extension it redirects attention toward how these women 
take up space and expand (through reproduction), Act 620 and its so-called “friends of 
the court” rely primarily on invisibility in order to enact legislative control and policing 
on their bodies and maternity. Without accounting for an unstable personhood assembled 
and disassembled through matrices of race, class, and gender, the court produces an 
undue burden on the body in which it is refused a right of personhood. In terms of 
precedence, a Supreme Court ruling in favor of the state would also bring to the forefront 
Roe v. Wade and the overall question of the access to not only abortion, but reproductive 
health as a whole, as a right.  Thus, Act 620 stems from and reiterates both local and 
national legal imaginaries and simultaneously influences them at extremely high stakes. 
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The Rhetorical Paradox of Louisiana Personhood for Black Women 
 What the framework of Law as Rhetoric offers is an articulation of the limitations 
of traditional legislative discourses and activism. Weheliye gestures to this by 
highlighting the limitation of using law as a trajectory point for race scholarship or 
theorization. Many forms of violence against/on the racial body are articulated as legal, 
such as within the penal system, which reiterates and reenacts the practice of the 
plantation (or death camp) but through a juridico-discursive plane. As such, treatment of 
the law as a static point-of-reference, rather than a living text and discourse that produces 
material effects, relegates race, racialization, and racism back to the primitive rather than 
accounting for its modern constitution and assemblage formation. Indeed, if the law were 
static or produced within a vacuum, which is what this ahistorical framework assumes, it 
would not be possible to reconceptualize or rearticulate race and gender within the legal 
imaginary. How then could Louisiana’s Crimes Against Nature Statute, through its 
repeated revisions, produce an exception for the victim of human trafficking and/or 
incest? 
 The importance of examining exception through the construction of the victim 
lies in what Weheliye argues as a type of preconditional suffering demanded by the court 
in order to obtain certain rights to personhood. In order for the subject to not be 
recognized as ‘not guilty’ (a category not immediately assigned to the nonhuman subject) 
they must be proven to be a victim of circumstance. As the current Louisiana CANS 
statute states: 
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C.(1) It shall be an affirmative defense to prosecution for a violation of Paragraph 
(A)(1) of this Section that, during the time of the alleged commission of the 
offense, the defendant was a victim of trafficking of children for sexual purposes 
as provided in R.S. 14:46.3(E). Any child determined to be a victim pursuant to 
the provisions of this Paragraph shall be eligible for specialized services for 
sexually exploited children.  
(LA Rev Stat § 14:89) 
 
 
The statute then attempts to differentiate between a criminal offender and a victim: 
 
(2) It shall be an affirmative defense to prosecution for a violation of Paragraph 
(A)(1) of this Section that, during the time of the alleged commission of the 
offense, the defendant is determined to be a victim of human trafficking pursuant 
to the provisions of R.S. 14:46.2(F). Any person determined to be a victim 
pursuant to the provisions of this Paragraph shall be notified of any treatment or 
specialized services for sexually exploited persons to the extent that such services 
are available. (ibid)  
 
 
Those who gain access to victimhood through the narrative process of the courtroom not 
only dodge the violence of the incarceration complex but also navigate toward the 
possibly of the not-quite-human. Perhaps. However, those sex workers who have been 
denied victim status due to an assumed exercise of agency (also due to the narrative 
process of the courtroom) and their subsequent branding as ‘sex offenders’ emphasizes 
the dangers of reading race and gender as ontological absolutes rather than as active 
assemblages that are constituted and reconstituted through active the rhetorical processes 
and spaces of law. As Weheliye contends, “[p]olitical violence plays a crucial part in the 
baroque techniques of modern humanity, since it simultaneously serves to create not-
quite-humans in specific acts of violence and supplies the symbolic source material for 
racialization” (28). In Spillers’: “We might concede, at the very least, that sticks and 
bricks might break our bones, but words will most certainly kill us” (68). The victim and 
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the agent; the mother and the nonmother; the human, the not-quite human, and the 
subhuman, are all rhetorical acts of naming that occur within the juridical process and 
then are exercised on/against the body through restrictions, policing, incarceration, etc. In 
the case of Act 620, an undue burden, through rhetorical silence, restricts the body: 
women cannot go to this provider because this provider does not have this particular 
admitting privilege at this particular hospital. As such, like the victim of sex trafficking, 
the rural Black woman becomes circumstantial: by averting the gaze away from her she is 
no longer part of the discussion. When one is no longer part of the discussion in the 
courtroom, one becomes invisible.  
 The latest CANS controversy arose in the complex and debilitating aftermath of 
Hurricane Katrina in 2005. Though most of post-Katrina coverage was highly 
narrativizing, including personal testimony as well as journalistic stories of survival and 
resistance, the voices of Black women were largely left out. Instead, much of the mass 
media representation of these women during Hurricane Katrina were images and videos 
of pilfering and desperation, as many could either not afford to leave or believed that, due 
to the prevalence of hurricanes in that area, that they could ride the storm out. These 
images and videos were played largely out of context and with the majority showing 
nonwhite, specifically Black, people. The narrative and rhetorical hypervisibility of Black 
bodies as criminal is noted by Michelle Miles and Duke W. Austin: “During and after 
Katrina, Blacks and Whites experienced two different realities in large part due to their 
differing negotiation of rumour—and the mass media played to and exploited this” (34). 
Controlling images and narratives of Black survival versus white survival underscore the 
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contemporary reiterations of the metalanguage around Blackness, even in times of 
collective crisis. 
Those black women who were not displaced and who worked in the street-based 
economy of New Orleans faced a climax of criminalization in post-Katrina efforts to 
reinstate a moral social order. The Crimes Against Nature Statute, which throughout 
centuries has criminalized multiple sex acts, saw a repositioning in 1982 as a response to 
the AIDS crisis during which sex workers and gay men became hypervisible causes of its 
spread. The result, CANS, not only enforced disciplinary action through imprisonment 
and fines but also mandated fifteen years’ registration as a sex offender for one 
conviction and a lifetime registry for two convictions. Andrea J. Ritchie, a police 
misconduct attorney, extends the consequences of the enforcement of law on an 
individual basis: 
 
[i]n addition to the myriad mandated sex offender registration and notification 
requirements, local police or state officials had the discretion to seek imposition of 
additional registration requirements, such as posting bumper stickers, signs, 
handbills, and clothing labels identifying plaintiffs as sex offenders, refuse to 
accept certain forms or proof of residence, or deny plaintiffs permission to be 
away from their usual address for more than seven days (35, emphasis added). 
 
 
Through discretion on the part of the police about who gets charged with CANS and who 
gets charged with prostitution, the criminalizing effects of CANS extended beyond the 
‘male problem’ introduced in the 1980s to target Black women. Laura McTighe and 
Deon Haywood note that by 2011, “ninety-seven percent of women registered as sex 
offenders were mandated to do so because of a conviction” and that “seventy-nine 
percent of those registered because of CANS were Black” (266). These women exist in a 
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doubled state of invisibility through the postbellum Jim Crow carceral sphere where 
Black women became increasingly criminalized and imprisoned. They then became 
simultaneously hypervisible, where Black women in sex work became marked as points 
of revision and discipline. The federal move by the Department of Justice to make funds 
available to rebuild New Orleans’ criminal justice system post-Katrina, which mandates 
the targeting and apprehension of ‘felony fugitives’ such as those registered as sex 
offenders, expedited this hypervisibility (271). As a result, women with CANS 
convictions faced a lack of access to social services and abuse protections, even 
criminalizing them further in abusive situations. 
 However, most pertinent about the CANS struggle is that it was able to be enacted 
on a much more individualized basis because there were two laws in effects regarding the 
prosecution of sex workers in Louisiana. The Criminal Statute regarding prostitution, still 
in effect today, takes precedence when CANS is overturned and mandates minimum 
prison sentences, minimum bail, and even counseling and health services. The 
simultaneous existence of these statutes allows for the police to be both law enforcers and 
lawmakers: through their ability to arrest and submit to prosecution under specific, 
separate and different laws, their violence, both direct and institutional, is at their 
discretion. This opens up pathways for law enforcement to act on what they might deem 
as “reasonable suspicion” or “probable cause,” highly racialized and gendered inferences 
that designate who is a threat and who is not. Ritchie emphasizes that, 
 
Police are not simply enforcing unjust laws which can be challenged, reformed or 
repealed, but rather are making law and creating classifications every day in 
countless interactions, through projections of highly racialized and deeply classed 
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social constructions and relations of gender and sexuality onto our racially 
gendered bodies (367). 
 
 
Richie’s argument highlights the active and dynamic functions of law as rhetoric, and 
subsequently how rhetoric becomes law. As she notes, the creation, practice, and 
influence of law are not isolated to the courtroom or some further distant space of 
deliberation. Rather, through separate instances of interpretation and enforcement, law is 
borne and conceptualized in multiple spaces but begins outside of legislative institutions, 
most often on the street. As such, the dispensation of juridical personhood is first initiated 
where Black women are always already unsafe. According to Weheliye, due to the 
capacities of racialized assemblages as being heavily reliant on the relationality of 
components, not only of gender, race, sexuality, and class, but also of space and place, 
these assemblages are fluid, displaceable, as replaceable onto bodies. In other words, 
examining the action of and ability to enforce on an individualized level that 
disproportionately targets Black women, both cisgender and transgender, makes obviousa 
(but not the—this is a phenomenon that occurs and reoccurs, articulates and rearticulates) 
discipline of Black women as nonhumans.  
 Furthermore, the differentiation of nomenclature between a criminal code statute 
regarding prostitution and a statute which places an act under the category of Crime 
Against Nature addresses quite directly the situation of Black women as rhetorical, 
racialized assemblage of the nonhuman. After all, the trajectory of the Louisiana legal 
imaginary regarding Black persons, persons of color and of mixed racial descent, queer 
persons, but most specifically and largely Black women, have been constructed as 
 21 
orienting toward protecting societal good or some abstract ‘quality of life.’ Both 
invisibility (restricting or refusing access to citizenship rights) and hypervisibility 
(identifying or locating Black women as ‘the problem,’ or architects of their own 
invisibility) have been reiterated throughout Louisiana since the early nineteenth century. 
A tradition of Louisiana law in all of its peculiarity is to position Black women as a threat 
to the family and the moral social order.  
 Though CANS was more concerned with the sexual act itself and the subsequent 
hypervisibility of the Black women in Louisiana’s street-based economies by branding 
them as sex offenders, the question of its circumstantial nature speaks again to Act 620. 
By means of being indicted under this or that statute meant whether one had access to 
certain resources and services, but it also meant being first made visible: the 
identification marker ensured that policing would continue. In a similar strain, Act 620 
restricts access to those in lower-income and/or rural areas through invisibility and 
silence. While Women With a Vision, June Medical Services, Afiya Center, and many 
others bring to the forefront the women who are adversely affected by the legislation, 
those who support Act 620 address these issues dismissively. Such rhetorical silences 
point to what is at stake in the visibility of Black women in the courtroom and legislative 
imaginary:  by not looking at, listening to, or addressing them explicitly, their entire 
situation becomes circumstantial. Such an unstable personhood never quite attains the 
status of human. Becoming circumstantial might be a part of becoming nonhuman.  
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Conclusion: The Undue Burden, or, the Re-articulation of the Black Woman Subject 
 There are two dominant arguments in support of Act 620 which refuse Black 
women subjecthood and agency in the legal imaginary. However, they operate 
differently. The first is an assertion that the law works to protect women seeking abortion 
care by ensuring that the providers have taken adequate responsibility to ensure that the 
patient has access to emergency care. According to the purposes stated in the original 
house bill, 
 
It intent of the legislature that each physician who performs an abortion as defined 
in R.S. 40:1299.35.1, whether the abortion is surgical or drug-induced, shall 
follow the long-established procedure of reporting anonymous, aggregate abortion 
statistics and health complications to the Department of Health and Hospitals, 
subject to all state and federal privacy protections, for the purpose of providing 
anonymous and accurate public health and safety data regarding abortion and its 
impact on women's health. (House Bill 388 p.4) 
 
 
In turn, activists against Act 620 argue that regardless of the abortion provider’s 
admitting privileges, patients may seek emergency care on their own behalf, marking this 
argument irrelevant. Kristen Clarke, the President and Executive Director for Lawyers’ 
Committee for Civil Rights Under Law (Lawyers’ Committee), also points to the fact that 
the risk of complication during an abortion is extremely low, especially compared to 
common procedures such as wisdom tooth extraction. However, Clarke highlights that 
the risks of the law are specific, but far reaching: 
  
Without the access to abortion care, Black women maybe find themselves unable 
to attain basic tenants of civil rights, such as adequate healthcare, housing, 
education, and employment […]. Such care is especially essentially for young 
people to determine their futures: Of the Black women in Louisiana who sought 
abortion care in 2018, 78% were under the age of 30.   
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With no examples offered up as to how exactly this case would protect women, 
especially in the case of abortion and/or emergency care, activists argue that the act 
would simply create undue burden—and this burden would most directly affect Black 
women. By refusing to account for how Black women not only make up the majority 
percentage of those seeking abortions, but also the majority percentage of the birth 
mortality rate and those suffering from income inequality in Louisiana, Act 620 obscures 
subjecthood and citizenship rights. These women are not simply forgotten, but omitted or 
erased, as non-relevant to the society that the legal system aims to maintain and protect.  
 The second argumentative move in support of Act 620, Clarke reveals, is that 
“[…] the law is motivated, at least partly, by the stigmatizing belief that Black women 
who have abortions commit genocide.”  This argument is specifically peculiar because it 
is both bound with and at tension with the figure of the Black woman as a threat to the 
white family. By refusing to stay in her own racial bounds, she is a threat to whiteness; 
however, here she is also formulated as a threat to the Black family and Blackness. In this 
way, the Black woman is again an architect of her own demise as well as the demise of 
her own community. The Black woman is the problem. What is not said, what is not 
accounted for, is often what gets emphasized: what is not is what should be not. The 
victimization at work here is often identified with a paternal tone often taken up by the 
legal imaginary: in the passing of the law, the restriction of access becomes a means of 
protection not only against ‘irresponsible’ providers without admitting privileges but 
against themselves as well. The undue burden becomes a promise of protection. The lack 
of access to becomes an investment in.  
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 Throughout this piece, I have endeavored to show how Act 620 is both non-
peculiar and peculiar: it speaks to a longer trajectory of a legal system that has used social 
and governmental techniques of power in order to not simply erase Black women, but to 
make them invisible. Invisibility, it should be clear, is distinct from erasure: the law does 
not remove Black women from the picture. This should be emphasized: Black women are 
never not-present. Their inhabitance of the courtroom, or of the legal imaginary for that 
matter, should not be questioned. If this were the case, then the subsequent hypervisibility 
could not occur. The presence of the Black woman is not the question; rather, it is how 
her presence gets to be visible. What rhetorical moments, however seemingly small, 
move her from out-of-the-question and circumstantial towards the question-to-be-
answered, the constant problem in which we must monitor in order to control and nullify?  
Act 620 is a moment such as this, however it not so small. As noted above and in 
various other pieces on this Supreme Court decision, Act 620, though a state-focused 
piece of legislation, has a national implication for re-thinking the legislation since Roe v. 
Wade. Roe v. Wade, in 1973 to now on women’s reproductive healthcare. Who has the 
agency in these laws, the courts, the medical institutions, or the woman subject? Here, 
“woman subject” refers to the idea of the woman-as-subject, which is linked closely with 
the biological notion of woman as a reproductive sex, or at least a subject capable of 
reproduction. As such, her reproductive state gets bound with her subjectivity. The 
connection between the woman subject, her presumed biological disposition, and her 
agency have largely affected how and where their presence appears in both legislation 
and medical practice. On the other hand, Act 620 emphasizes how even those rhetorical 
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moves that appear agentive operate as assemblages on the pretense of being on “behalf” 
of those women subjects. Thus, the agency of woman rhetors becomes out-of-the-
question as the responsibility and consequences move away from considering their 
subjectivity as even relevant. By moving the gaze away from these women and toward 
the doctor with or without admitting privileges, the woman-subject and her body fail to 
have voice in a conversation that ironically has the largest material effects on them.  
Further, the circumstantiality of the woman-subject speaks to the peculiarity of 
Black women’s assemblage as nonhuman in the legal imaginary. The largest amount 
affected by the law is working-and-lower-class Black women in rural areas, which has 
been a dismissed argument due to their circumstantial nature. Rather, Black women 
become enveloped into a larger rhetorical subject category: that of all women. This erupts 
not only in the strategy of the state, who argues that by enforcing the admitting policy 
that they are somehow protecting all women from an evil for-profit abortion industry but 
also in the case of June Medical Services and their own friends of the court, who argue 
that they are protecting the autonomy of all women. As Spillers illuminates the violence 
in refusing gendered monikers, what violence happens when the gendered name gets 
privileged in a legislative trajectory where that gender has been historically white. 
Moreover, this points to the dangers of trying to establish a claim to legal personhood in 
an imaginary that, as Weheliye points out, demands and re-inscribes violence and pre-
conditional suffering as the only means to obtain such a personhood: “[A]s evidenced in 
the prison-industrial complex, the pretense of juridical equality rarely abolishes selective 
legal insouciance or genocidal acts against those who have been touched by racializing 
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assemblages of the flesh” (88). However, in the immediate case of a ruling regarding 
bodily autonomy, the refusal of legal personhood in favor of other possibilities is not only 
impractical but highlights how a gendered articulation of humanity still leads us back to 
the racialized assemblage. In both its local and national trajectories, either ruling 
reiterates violence because it folds the Black woman into the subjectivity of Woman. 
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“WILL YOU TEST YOUR STRENGTH OUT ON ME?”:  COMIC DISRUPTIONS 
AND THE RHETORICAL MEMOIR 
 
Either you will cry or laugh, and I try my best to figure out how to do the second 
one. I know life is no laughing matter, but having experiences can be 
Tiffany Haddish, The Last Black Unicorn 
Upon the success of her first Netflix comedy special Nanette, Hannah Gadsby 
wonders if she should have “budgeted” her trauma a bit more (Douglas 2020). This is a 
striking statement for many reasons; the first is that we hardly consider trauma as the 
subject matter for laughing or joy. Comedy, understood as a means of catharsis and even 
relaxation, is often positioned as away from the traumatic and painful and instead towards 
the silly, mundane, and lighthearted. However, walking us through the grammatical 
structure of jokes and through the means by which she became a comedian, Gadsby 
repeatedly undermines the binary between “high art” and “low art” to show us that jokes 
do much more than simply make the audience laugh. Gadsby instead offers that jokes and 
overall narrative humor can be an act of violence as well as an act of hope. Repeatedly 
stating that “you learn from the part of the story you focus on,” Gadsby articulates a 
complex framework of joke-telling as a rhetorical act that can be both dangerous and 
proliferative (Nanette 2018). This framework speaks to Jacqueline Jones Royster’s 
interventions on subject position and subject matter and her emphasis on how personal 
storytelling and testimony “placed one against another against another build credibility 
and offer […] a litany of evidence from which a call for transformation in theory and 
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practice might rightfully begin” (Royster 123). Royster’s major intervention is with who 
tells and arranges these stories: “I have come to recognize, however, that when the 
subject matter is me and the voice is not mine, my sense of order and rightness is 
disrupted.” While Royster provides the importance of being able to tell one’s own stories 
and perspectives, Gadsby highlights the precariousness of rhetorical agency when it 
comes in contact with genre and audience. Gadsby’s assertion that she needs to tell [her] 
story properly” gestures towards the possibility of there being wrong ways of telling 
one’s own story, wherein even though the subject matter has become the subject, order 
and rightness are still refused by the audience (Nanette 2018). In short, while comedy 
increasingly offers the ability to inhabit a stage and tell one’s own narrative, the functions 
and consequences of this narrative are shaped and informed by the rhetorical demands of 
the genre.  
This thesis examines representative work by four comics--Mindy Kaling, Ali 
Wong, Tiffany Haddish, and Hannah Gadsby--and investigates how they draw on not 
only their personal experience, but the economy of comedy, in order to assert their 
rhetorical agency as well as critique the dismissal of their comedic success as 
circumstantial. The economy of comedy is a two-fold: first there is the literal economy of 
comedy as something that is produced for consumption, where supply and demand 
necessitate a regulation and distribution of comedic work. That work which appeals to the 
largest consumer base is often that which is deemed the most successful. Branching off of 
this literal economy, the regulation and distribution become a matter of asking who is 
producing comedy for whom. In this way, the economy of comedy could be understood 
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as what Lloyd F. Bitzer terms as a “rhetorical situation,” where the comedian/producer is 
the rhetor and the audience/consumer are not simply the audience, but a part of the 
situation to which the comedic rhetor is responding.  
I examine three stand-up specials, all produced by Netflix: Amy Wong’s Baby 
Cobra (2016), Hannah Gadsby’s Nanette (2018), and Tiffany Haddish’s Black Mitzvah 
(2019), along with three “memoir-works”: Mindy Kaling’s Why Not Me (2015), Tiffany 
Haddish’s Last Black Unicorn (2017), and Ali Wong’s Dear Girls (2019). I use the term 
“memoir-works” to refer to the not-quite-ness of the works (two in particular), to fall 
fully under the traditional memoir genre as well as to gesture to way the stand-up shows 
themselves also draw upon the same devices we find in memoir. Considering this shared 
technique, I also assert that the stand-up programs themselves can and should also be 
considered as memoir-works. Much like memoir in book form, stand-up comedy draws 
on the speaker’s personal experience in order to observe, respond, and even record 
moments. In addition, both draw on political and popular reference in order to situate 
themselves along and against social attitudes and assumptions. These comics make 
disruptive and necessary rhetorical moves, through the genre of comedy, rendering an 
audience that may not initially be perceived or understood to be rhetorical. Nonetheless, 
these rhetorical moves enable the comics to simultaneously invoke laughter while also 
sharing personal experiences not often considered “fitting” subject matter for the comedic 
stage. These comics’ memoir-works illustrate a desire that extends beyond mere 
representation to confrontation and even uncomfortable engagement. 
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Drawing from a variety of rhetorical engagements with comedy as well as from 
the theory of rhetorical situations, I make two claims about how these comics’ works 
should be valued for their rhetorical significance. The first claim is that while the comics 
themselves dismiss their work (both on and off stage)—a dismissal that the theory of 
rhetorical situations seemingly would uphold, their silly approach to sharing personal 
subject matter emphasizes a larger struggle to be seen as legitimate subjects. Through the 
comedic genre, personal storytelling is not only entertaining, but it allows these comics-
as-rhetors to bear witness to having been othered and to leverage this othering as their 
very subject matter. This move allows them to overwrite the script of othering and to use 
their rhetorical comedic voice to be themselves, teach their audiences, and also to fulfil 
their primary role of entertaining. The second claim is that the stand-up set documents 
one phenomenological reorientation while generating another. The first reorientation is 
the comics’ inhabitance of the stage, where their otherness is brought front and center; 
they literally move from the margins. The second reorientation is a disorientation of the 
audience, brought on by the centering of otherness in their focus. The orientation of the 
comedic other requires the disorientation of the comedic audience. In other words, as 
these comics gain rhetorical agency through their arrival on the stage, the demands, 
purposes, and overall entertainment outcomes of the comedic genre shift. 
The direct rhetorical purposes of the comedic works I look at vary by author and 
by form. Mindy Kaling’s Why Not Me is a collection of personal essays which draw on 
personal experience but by no means try to encapsulate her life as a whole. The book 
itself it rather short but positioned as a heartfelt confessional: one with clear rhetorical 
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moves: “I’m excited to share my stories so you can see what I’m really like” (Kaling 5). 
While Kaling’s collection of essays speaks to a more generalized (albeit still specialized 
in some ways) audience (the fan of comedy, or at least the fan-of-this-person-in-comedy), 
Wong’s work is framed as intended for her two daughters in order to educate, guide, and 
even confess to them. Dear Girls is marketed as a collection of letters also drawn on 
Wong’s personal experiences but written in a second-person format that is directive. She 
writes an inheritance for her daughters: “The idea for this book is inspired mostly by a 
note from my father than began with “Dear Alexandra”” (Wong xii). A gift from her 
father becomes another gift to her daughters: “These letters explore a lot of the topics I 
wish my father and I had discussed (and some I’m glad we didn’t tbh)” (xiii).  As such, 
these works operate like “memoir-works”; they give us flashes of personal narratives and 
reflection/response, but we can hardly hope that they are true autobiographical works. 
Rather, as Tiffany Haddish points out, they are “here to teach” (Black Mitzvah 2019). 
Though comedy is often dismissed due to its primary function as entertainment and 
further as an inappropriate means of discussing or disseminating observations and social 
commentary, these comedians have articulated purposes that exceed mere entertainment.   
Rhetoric’s Comedy Problem  
Comedy is often considered a theatrical genre as it involves storytelling. 
Considered useful to the dramatic stage, comedy is considered appropriate when reserved 
to entertainment and inappropriate when used in so-called “real world” situations. Most 
of these situations involve the political and public spheres, where discussions over class, 
race, gender, sexuality, ability, and many other factors are sought to be addressed with 
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tones of seriousness. Aristotle illustrates this when he contrasts the comedic writer in his 
two works Rhetoric and Poetics. In both, he treats the comedic as a form of ridicule, 
however he allows that at least in its poetic performance, comedy allows for a pleasure 
not afforded in tragic plots. Aristotle finds the different functions of comedy in rhetoric 
versus comedy in poetry in the different functions of rhetoric and poetry themselves. For 
rhetoric, Aristotle claims, “The modes of persuasion are the only true constituents of the 
art: everything else is merely accessory” (Rhetoric 19). Meanwhile, poetry, he argues is a 
form of imitation; it is imitation, he argues, by which men learn first. Moreover, Aristotle 
asserts, “And it is also natural for all to delight in works of imitation” (Poetics 227, my 
emphasis). To be clear, Aristotle’s discernment comes from the differing treatments of 
character and how it comes to be paired with its style of delivery He continues to 
emphasize that comedy is a form of ridicule: to imitate to ridicule is different than to 
persuade to ridicule. However, it is important to note here that Aristotle’s surrounding 
comedic landscape and archive of classical era Greece consisted of narratives in which 
players acted out events. In contrast, the image of the rhetor stood solo, relating to the 
audience not an imitative narrative but a strategic persuasion.  
Again, it is important to keep in mind that Aristotle was one man, living in 
ancient Greece, contributing only his share to a larger dialogue. Daphne O’Regan’s 
article “Rhetoric and Old Comedy” surveys the sophists response to comedy to 
emphasize the intermingling of comedic and rhetorical technique. Arguing that comedic 
drama and sophistic argumentation shared, among other things, orality, timely context 
(kairos), and the embodied situation of man, O’Regan shows how both shared the public 
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sphere and therefore intermingled regularly. The muddling of comedy-in-and-as-rhetoric 
has continued to flourish, at least in the Western European tradition of thought. For 
example, Jody Ender’s “Rhetoric and Comedy” provides insight into how lawyers in 
medieval France exercised dramatic techniques and in turn the stage-setting of the 
dramatic era was often a courtroom. In the twenty-first century, we have seen comedy 
take on many spaces and compositions, and it has very clearly been invoked in the 
current political setting: The White House Correspondents Dinner is one event wherein 
comedy and politics literally collide.   
There is a rich history where rhetors often invoke comedic techniques and 
comedic drama often uses the rhetorical setting as a focal point. However, though the 
comedic drama may be seen as a form of political commentary and the rhetorical space 
might occasionally use comedic undertone, comedy as a form of writing (and 
performance) has not necessarily figured as persuasive, or rhetorical. This could be due, 
perhaps, to two assumptions about comedy: (1) that a comic work is primarily fiction 
(this is to say that even when comic works are based on truths, they are treated as though 
their fictionalization comes first); and (2) that comedy is an act of ridicule. From its 
conception, stand-up comedy has challenged both of these assumptions. As an oratorical 
performance in which a comedian delivers a monologue to a large audience in a theater, 
the imagery alone calls to mind the familiar vision of the rhetorician delivering treatises 
to students and the general public. However, rather than focusing on grand morals, ethics, 
and personal versus social habit, comedians deliver personal anecdotes and stories from 
their lives, including of those around them. These comics comment on current events and 
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political situations, noting how these have created experiences for themselves, and, again, 
those around them. If anything, stand-up comedy comes from a “truer truth” than pure 
rhetorical work might: material, embodied, lived truth. While the theory of the rhetorical 
situation demands an articulation of an issue or problem—an exigence—that is identified 
outside of the body and primarily on a larger social scale, these comics-as-rhetors instead 
work from a personal background, where the situation first is located in their own bodies 
and experiences.  
Originated from various entertainment forms from the nineteenth century, stand-
up comedy has experienced a steady increase of both performance and consumption. In 
recent years, with streaming services such as Netflix and Hulu, people have access to 
more specials and series productions; for instance, there is a series featuring beginning 
comedians from “all around the world.” Such easy access to the material, along with its 
placement as comedic material (and therefore purely there for entertainment purposes), 
might obscure the rhetorical merits of these works. Because stand-up comedy is seen as 
by and for popular culture, it often gets dismissed; stand-up comedy can be influential, 
yes, but not persuasive. Or this might be an assumption. What happens when we do read 
stand-up comedy as a type of rhetoric? What about when we think of stand-up comedians 
as rhetors? Through this lens, what happens when comic Others arrive on the stage? How 
might they disrupt certain comic lines in order to explore other places of comic pleasure? 
Women Comics and Reorienting the Genre of Comedy 
Comedy as genre and as practice is oriented towards —meaning it is positioned 
by and for—a consumer base that is both racialized and gendered. Sarah Ahmed writes 
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extensively on the orientation of both space and bodies in Queer Phenomenology, 
emphasizing how objects and the spaces they inhabit shape bodies, impressing 
restrictions and imposing lines to follow. As Ahmed states, “Lines become the external 
trace of an interior world, as signs of who we are on the flesh that folds and unfolds 
before others” (18). The orientation of comedy by and for a large, “general” consumer 
base proliferates more than simply an economy of consumption and production for 
comedians to follow; instead, this economy takes place not only on the stage but on the 
body that inhabits this stage as well as the bodies that make up the audience. The 
orientation of comedy towards dominant voices—mainly white male voices—means that 
not only is the space itself oriented, but the bodies which carry these voices are oriented 
as well; they are able to move about and expand. For example, both Gadsby and Wong 
highlight the ease of the predominantly white male body and his subject matter on stage, 
pointing to the difference in ability to “take a joke” and well as giving that joke, 
depending on who receives what.  This double-orientation of both space and bodies begs 
the question of what it means to be “at home” or to “belong” on the stage, and further, 
how this belonging allows for certain voices that belong to certain bodies to be able to 
speak on and inhabit the stand-up stage with ease. Much like Ahmed’s critique of the 
“masculinity of philosophy,” which “is evidenced in the disappearance of the subject 
under the sign of the universal,” the masculinity and whiteness of stand-up comedy as a 
genre has provided white male bodies as the given vehicle of consumption (34, my 
emphasis). In other words, for white males, funniness and humor are given, assumed, and 
further, their inhabitance on the stage is presumed natural. Like philosophy, in comedy 
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white maleness disappears into a universal voice, one whose arrival on the stage is not 
only never questioned but is necessarily separated from this arrival and the history of 
labor and relationships that brought it about. However, while these “universal,” oriented 
voices come to inhabit and speak without question, those whom the stand-up stage is not 
oriented for (in other words, disoriented bodies) not only struggle to arrive on the stage 
but find their arrival is always a matter of question and scrutiny.  
Here, who consumes and who is listening become productive factors in comedy, 
ones that shape and inform its production and distribution. These comics illustrate the 
continuing quest to finally put an answer to a question so common that it became its own 
comedic trope:: Are women funny? We find them all answering that yes, of course women 
are funny, and it might just be because they are women! However, this is not the only 
question of their funniness wrapped up in their identity: three of these comics are women 
of color, and the fourth identifies as “a little bit lesbian” (Gadsby 2018). Prior to the 
2010s, stand-up comedy has been largely dominated by heterosexual white men due to 
the position of comedy as appealing to the majority, or “the masses.” However, with the 
rise of streaming services and an increase of non-majority (nonwhite, non-heterosexual, 
disabled, etc.) viewers that increasingly demand content that they can relate to, we have 
also seen a rise in comics that have a variety of identities and backgrounds. As such, the 
question of audience again becomes a matter of supply and demand—a matter that 
exceeds the assumption of comedy being for a general public or for mere means of 
entertainment. All four comics write and perform material on how their success has been 
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predicated on a cultural fad rather than a social need. In many ways, these comics show 
us how they come to get recognized as circumstantial. 
Going beyond abstract rhetorical concepts of subject and subject matter, however, 
these comedians assert how their circumstantiality is bound with their embodied 
Otherness. In other words, these comedians bring to the forefront the material realities of 
arriving on and maintaining their inhabitance of the stage. They also flesh out the 
sometimes violent, sometimes pleasurable paths their arrivals have taken, emphasizing 
how stand-up comedy can and is performed from lived experience. Through these 
material, physical invocations, Wong, Gadsby, Haddish, and Kaling situate their 
subjectivity and rhetorical voice as inextricably linked to not only their bodies’ 
inhabitance of the stage, but the history of that body as it is told over and over again. 
These embodied stories placed “one against another against another,” as Royster puts it, 
are not directly funny; instead, they often focus on places of discomfort and dis-
identification. However, and perhaps most importantly, these comedians draw on how 
these tense spaces of non-belonging have informed and shaped their subjectivity. 
Gadsby’s framework of joke telling offers an exigence—tension—that erupts long before 
her arrival on the stage and is embedded within her own presence: “I didn’t have to make 
the tension; I was the tension!” (Nanette 2018). In The Last Black Unicorn, Haddish 
writes on how comedy became an attempted and failed means of literal physical 
protection while living in foster homes: “I thought that if I made these girls laugh, they 
wouldn’t beat me up. They’d let me be the goofy one in the crew or something. But that 
didn’t really work” (Haddish 49). Meanwhile, Mindy Kaling writes on how comedy did 
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help her to find a place in a sorority at college, but at a price: “I thought I would like an 
environment of all women, where I was deemed the ‘funny one.’ But it took me twelve 
weeks to realize that I don’t really like organizations where people are ‘deemed’ things” 
(Kaling 39). Comedy is about how one does or does not belong. In other words, comedy 
becomes about being disoriented when the material is not performed for nor originated 
from those whom the language or space is oriented for; the orientation of the comedic 
Other demands the disorientation of the comedic audience. Rather than simply “poking 
fun” and providing commentary on the mundane, these comedians show how comedy has 
been a means of making sense of how one inhabits this world while also offering a 
lexicon and grammar to articulate it in ways that are not only accessible to their audience, 
but also, importantly, accessible to themselves. In this way, stand-up comedy is both 
rhetorical and phenomenological. The orientation (or disorientation) of bodies in the 
comedic space can be the factor that allows  for a rhetorical purpose or event to erupt.  
There is a small, but growing, field of writing on contemporary comedy and rhetoric with 
an even smaller portion focusing specifically on stand-up writing and performance. A 
collection of this writing, Stand Up, Speak Out: Stand Up Comedy and the Rhetoric of 
Social Change, features sixteen articles on stand-up comedy as a medium capable of 
eliciting social change, highlighting the accessibility of the genre as a key factor. 
However, while this collection offers important insight to comedy as response and 
intervention, there is little written on how embodiment and the space of the comedic 
stage affects who gets to speak and on what subject matter. For example, Alberto 
González’s chapter “Response: Stand Up, Race and Culture from Insult to Reflection” 
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presents the work of Lenny Bruce and his comedic influence as an important departure 
away from and against the racist humor of the 1950s where “In the case of stand-up 
comedy, the absence of critical interrogation of race relations during the Civil Rights Era 
emphasizes its presence in the larger society and the corresponding need for inclusion 
among comics” (128). While the absence and presence of certain dialogues and comedic 
techniques around Otherness is covered extensively, the absence and presence of Other 
bodies/voices themselves has not been raised as a necessary intervention into comedy. As 
Royster highlights of the state of Other bodies/voices being “subject matter but not 
subjects,” the praise of white male (oriented) comedians for addressing and critiquing 
racial and gendered tensions on the stage occludes the absence and presence of the bodies 
that experience these tensions (and subsequent violence) firsthand (Royster 125). As 
such, when these Other bodies arrive on the stage and speak, much more than a response 
to a rhetorical situation occurs. Royster writes:  
 
If I take my cue from the life of Ida Wells, and am bold enough to go beyond the 
presentation of my stories as juicy tidbits for the delectation of audiences, to 
actually shift or even subvert a paradigm, I’m much more likely to receive a wide-
eyed stare and to have the value and validity of my conceptual position held at a 
distance, in doubt, and wonderfully absorbed in the silence of appreciation (127). 
 
 
When those that make up the subject matter of interventional work become subjects 
themselves, or when Other bodies practice their own interventional comedy by relying on 
their personal experience, a distance is closed between that which seems far away (the 
Other, the silent subject matter) and that which is centered (the white speaking subject). 
While white, masculine comedians like Bruce are said to have “worked to make the 
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absence present” (González 128), comedians who are women of color and/or queer, like 
Wong, Haddish, Kaling, and Gadsby, work to make their presence present. 
The Appropriate Inappropriate: Silliness as Functional Rhetorical Response 
All four comedians not only draw on their personal backgrounds and experiences 
in order to write and produce comedy but also locate these private spaces as critical 
points in their arrival on the stage and their resulting subject formation. As such, how 
these comedians inhabit, arrive at, and move in-between spaces informs and helps to 
produce both subject matter and subject formation. The stage is a space of many concerns 
in regard to this as both restrictive but also generative Key to these comedians’ memoir-
works are practices of recording differences in their experiences both before and after 
their arrival on the stage as well the continuous instability of their inhabitance of public 
and recognized comedic space. Often these comedians contrast the repeated labor they 
perform in both acquiring and maintaining this inhabitance with observations of quick 
acceptance of comedians considered to be more “mainstream” or “identifiable.”  
 While comedy’s accessibility and potential as a tool for social change is often and 
more increasingly noted, the treatment of comedic works is far from a serious rhetorical 
intervention or response. In other words, though comedy can and is perceived as a 
response, this response does not effectively meet the requirements set forth by its 
rhetorical situation. Lloyd F. Bitzer gives a defining characteristic of the rhetorical 
situation: “In any rhetorical situation there will be at least one controlling exigence which 
functions as the organizing principle: it specifies the audience to be addressed and the 
change to be effected” (7). Though stand-up comedy, and comedy in general for that 
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matter, is framed as commentary and engagement with the social and political and can 
even address specific movements and events, it is often argued as falling short of 
providing or enacting the “change to be effective.” Wong, Haddish, Kaling, and Gadsby 
are aware of the ineffective and trivial framework of their genre, gesturing to it in both 
direct dismissals of their own work as serious as well as by challenging the perception of 
the genre as an easy access point for all. Hannah Gadsby tells her audience that “none of 
us are leaving here a better person” (Nanette 2018); while Ali Wong laments how she 
was “tricked” into being the breadwinner of her family, offering a narrative of how she 
purposely “traps” a Harvard-educated suitor only to be using her comedy labor to be 
paying off his student loans (Baby Cobra 2016). Meanwhile, Mindy Kaling refuses any 
comedic ethos predicated on a direct response to political and social situations, instead 
offering over two hundred pages of embarrassing anecdotes and even shallow exchanges 
with world leaders. Writing on her invitation to the White House to meet the president, 
Kaling centers her limited knowledge, referencing mostly popular cultural references 
such as Marilyn Monroe’s affair with John F. Kennedy and blaming her dislike of her 
guide on her knowledge of The West Wing and The American President, two political 
television shows set in the White House. Kaling writes, “My perception of people in the 
White House has been shaped 100 percent by Aaron Sorkin” (137). In Black Unicorn, 
Tiffany Haddish also refuses the purposeful comedic ethos but goes further to simplify 
her comedic career as a mere form of survival: “I don’t know how or why, but all the bad 
shit stopped. All of it. Just from doing open mics” (139). Later on, Haddish frames her 
stand-up special Black Mitzvah as a celebration. However, like Gadsby, Wong, and 
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Kaling, Haddish’s work, though purposefully framed in the trivial, goes on to confront 
and challenge numerous narratives and assumptions that revolve around her body and its 
arrival on the stage.  
Richard E. Vatz’s critical response to Bitzer’s rhetorical situation provides the 
groundwork for why stand-up comedy does not meet the expectations of a proper 
rhetorical response. Similar to the means by which these four comedians have 
emphasized the personal and trivial nature of their work, Vatz critiques that personal 
experience and response may reflect the beliefs of the individual responder, they “do not, 
however, tell us about qualities within the situation” (154). While Bitzer frames the 
rhetorical situation as that which comes first and elicits a response, Vatz presents a 
situation as articulable and definable through its linguistic interpretations. Vatz argues, 
 
The critical question, therefore, is what accounts for the choice by political 
spectators and participants of what to organize into a meaningful structure and 
what to ignore. Any rhetor is involved in this sifting and choosing front-page 
stories versus comic-page stories or the speaker highlighting facts about a person 
in a eulogy (156). 
 
 
While Bitzer argues that the rhetorical is situational, Vatz argues that the situation is, 
itself, a rhetorical construction. In other words, Bitzer’s framework offers an event or 
situation as that which elicits a rhetorical response that identifies and enacts moments of 
change while Vatz positions the communication of the event or situation as that which 
shapes and informs a response. Stand-up comedy, as drawing on personal experience and 
framed as social commentary rather than drawing from what is to be considered the 
“proper” choice of facts and events, is at clear tension with both Bitzer’s rhetorical 
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situation and its demands as well as Vatz’s argument that an existing rhetorical 
perspective is necessary in order to enact persuasion or change. In contrast, stand-up as a 
mode of entertainment does not rely on established and wide-reaching, general sources of 
knowledge (i.e., the “front page”) and instead often relies on “lower,” more personalized 
modes of understanding through personal experience and relational comprehension. In 
other words, while comedy provides a rhetorical purpose of engagement and response 
through tension and its subsequent release, it falls short of the persuasive goal which Vatz 
suggests. As these four comedians note and even sometimes reinforce, comedic work and 
stand-up in particular does not necessitate a call for action or even a drive for change. To 
repeat Gadsby, “none of us are leaving here a better person.”  
 However, although all four comedians express a sort of “purposelessness” to their 
performative and written work and although they consistently deconstruct their own ethos 
and rhetorical agency on the stage, all six works also express a desire to enact or affect 
some sort of difference by the end of their work. Haddish’s The Last Black Unicorn and 
Kaling’s Why Not Me both articulate a desire to inspire and enact identification. 
Haddish’s introduction is framed as an invitation to her audience—one that elicits both 
identification and disidentification: “I decided to write this book in the hope that someone 
will read it and feel like, “If she can do it, I know I can!”” (i). The end of Kaling’s text 
includes an anecdote about a group of young women of color lining up to ask for her 
advice at the end of an interview and how Kaling feels she failed her through fumbled 
advice. Ending her collection of essays on subject matter that ranges from the beauty 
secrets of Hollywood, to romantic relationship and sexual fantasies, to meeting the 
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president and receiving her own television contract, Kaling offers revised and assertive 
advice to the young women of color. Though these comedians repeatedly undermine their 
own work, they still continue to express hope that the personal narratives they write and 
perform culminate in more than simply entertainment. However, the sense of purpose put 
forth by these comedians is not identifiable in either a distant or fully realized situation 
nor one that is first filtered through a rhetorical linguistic. Rather, Wong, Haddish, 
Kaling, and Gadsby all respond to a situation that is first and foremost identifiable within 
their own bodies. In other words, their own inhabitance and embodied experience makes 
up and forms the situation to which the comedians react. Along the lines of Royster, the 
subject becomes the subject matter.  
Rhetorical Response as Phenomenological Reorientation 
This truth, as can be seen from above, originates in those personal anecdotes and 
stories. A stand-up joke comes from a story. You can get a story from what happens to 
you. In Nanette, Hannah Gadsby talks of stories. She tells us, “You learn from the part of 
the story you focus on” (Gadsby 2018). Breaking down the grammatical structure of a 
story versus a joke, she notes that for a joke to take place, a loss in the story must occur. 
A joke can be seen as a deviation from a story: it stops at a point along a narrative line 
and moves towards a punchline, a point of relief from the climax. We can suppose this is 
why it’s called “comic relief.” So, the loss is the ending: the joke fails to attend to the 
points of tension that demand release. What it does, instead, is reorient the audience 
toward a different side of that tension: the question of possibility it provides, a question 
of what would happen if we were to respond in a different way. Gadsby notes the 
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relationship between herself as joke-giver and her audience as joke receivers: “[I]n this 
context, what a joke is, is a question that I have artificially inseminated. Tension. I do 
that. That’s my job. I make you feel all tense, and then I make you laugh, and you’re like 
[sighs] ‘Thanks for that.’” Emphasizing that her role as joke-giver relies on an exchange 
(she gives the tension to the audience), Gadsby raises many questions about what the role 
of a comedian is or what the platform of the stand-up stage offers. Most importantly, 
Gadsby questions her arrival on the stage and what her body inhabiting that space does. 
 Gadsby’s formulaic approach to comedy reinforces Ahmed’s theorizing on queer 
phenomenology and the affect alien, where Gadsby’s own discomfort and unhappiness in 
certain spaces extends to her inhabitance of the stage. Indeed, immediately we can note 
the centrality of Gadsby’s queerness as necessary to her affective response and technique. 
Ahmed’s Queer Phenomenology asks what it means for a body to be “oriented,” or 
rather, what it means to be in a space that extends a body’s reach and to be surrounded by 
objects that provide motility to that body. In terms of phenomenology, motility of the 
body is concerned with how and where that body can move, and how easily or difficult 
that movement can be depending on the body and the space it inhabits. In terms of the 
comedic stage, I am considering how certain normative bodies experience an easier 
arrival on that stage than Others. This motility also has to do with how our bodies interact 
with that space and inform it. Ahmed revisits Husserl’s table throughout the work, asking 
how we might turn ourselves toward the table, how we might find the table among other 
objects, and how we situate that table along a background. She asks how we arrive at the 
table and points to how the table might be inherited. Noting how it might be easier for 
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some to get to the table more than others, Ahmed also points to the work it might take to 
arrive at the table. Gadsby is concerned with the stage: how has she arrived here? 
Because she is a comedian; she is a joke-giver. To give a joke is to have a joke, to have 
been given or to have inherited that joke. To have a joke is to have a story.  
The stories from which jokes are born, she presents, can have too pleasant 
endings: her mother becomes the so-called “hero” of her coming-out-story. But they can 
also be traumatic: the violence on the body, as when she reveals the true truth of what 
happened at the bus stop. Gadsby reorients her audience towards tension; in fact, she 
locates herself as tension. She is a tense object, a space where tense events occur. This 
tension occurs in the event of misunderstanding. Gadsby may be disoriented. To be 
disoriented, according to Ahmed, is to be “out of line” with the proper objects, to be 
restricted by the spaces you inhabit rather than extended by them. In this way, Gadsby 
can neither meet the appropriate entertainment demands of the comedic genre nor the 
“fitting response” to the rhetorical situation. Early on, Gadsby illustrates how spaces do 
not extend to meet her. She notes how homosexuality was criminalized in Tasmania until 
1997; how, socially, lesbians’ stability was fragile: “Do they even exist if no one’s 
watching, really?” (Gadsby 2018). She goes on to material about how she had trouble 
identifying with the representation of gay life she had had access to as a child. 
Commenting on the loud, busy party she saw in footage of Sydney Mardi Gras, she asks 
her audience, “Where do the quiet gays go?” Gadsby is concerned not only with places in 
which she is restricted and tense, she is looking about for places to go in which she can 
stretch out and feel comfort. 
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 Nanette begins with an arrival: Gadsby unlocks and opens the front door to her 
house, where two dogs rush to meet her. She deposits her keys, sunglasses, and phone 
into baskets arranged on a shelf by the door. She puts on her glasses and looks before her; 
the camera cuts to her walking down a hallway, her hand trailing along the wall to her 
right. Moving to her kitchen, a refrigerator is shown with pictures tacked along the side. 
A bouquet of sunflowers sits arranged below. Gadsby’s figure moves to an electric kettle, 
switches it on, and reaches to her left for a tea pot. A cup of tea is made. Her house is 
arranged, and her practices of arrival are reflected as just that: practice. Gadsby settles in; 
she makes herself “at home.” Despite this, Gadsby spends the special showing us how 
very not “at home” she is. Her out-of-placeness comes from her incoherence: she notes 
how when first perceived, she might be a “good bloke.” However, this perception is only 
temporary: soon she’s a “trickster woman.” She notes how this often happens in small 
towns. She expresses her discomfort in being in a small town and how these spaces 
restrict her reach. Ahmed writes on how disorientation “involves failed orientations: 
bodies inhabit spaces that do not extend their shape or use objects that do not extend their 
reach. At this moment of failure, such objects “point” somewhere else or the make what 
is “here” become strange” (Ahmed 160). Gadsby turns back to the stage and to her role as 
joke-giver: “I have to quit comedy” (Gadsby 2018). Gadsby tells us she must leave the 
stage because she has built a living on self-deprecation, something she can no longer do 
anymore. The stage, like the small town, has been restricting her and her body can no 
longer sustain inhabiting that space. Stress and tension can be embodied: “Bodies can 
even take the shape of such stress, as point of social and physical pressure than can be 
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experienced as a physical press on the surface of the skin” (Ahmed 160). Nanette will 
continue to show us how the body taking up that space is a question of particular 
importance. 
 To have a story to tell is to have a body impressed by tension. Gadsby makes this 
very clear to her audience. However, it is not only her tension which has, as of late, taken 
place on the comedy stage and with the comedian body. Comedians who disorient and 
are disoriented cannot bend to fit into the comedic space before them; at least not without 
those violent repercussions that Gadsby mentions when she asserts that she must “quit 
comedy.” Instead, these comics, through their full inhabitance, disorient the space itself 
along with the audience that inhabits it with them. What happens when audiences get 
reoriented towards tension, and the comedian-body as a tense object? What happens 
when those arrive to “provide tension relief” are those who come from tense 
backgrounds? Comedy, both in poetic and rhetorical forms, is often seen as a male-
dominated space, and a white one at that. As such, the stand-up stage has been shaped by 
and for those bodies which dominate it, allowing those bodies to extend with ease, while 
those who bodies which are considered Other, may find the space restricting, perhaps 
claustrophobic.  
Those dominating bodies are oriented: they have not only come into this space by 
through an ease of proximity to it, but through their inheritance of that space. To inhabit 
this space when one is not oriented for it can be to be stopped. Comedians that are “not 
funny,” or rather, only perceived as funny when seen as an object to be beheld rather 
than a subject committing an act of humor, are often stopped, and asked “how did you get 
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here?” Ali Wong, an Asian American comic with Chinese and Vietnamese heritage, hints 
at this in a collection of letters to her daughters, titled Dear Girls: Intimate Tales, Untold 
Secrets, and Advice for Living Your Best Life. Describing a moment that she recounts as 
being made to feel “like a real outsider,” Wong writes of a man who touches her pregnant 
belly and asks, “So this is your hook, this is your thing, right?” (Wong 72). An ironic 
moment here: because she must not be funny (due to her Otherness—her necessary 
distance from what shapes the comedic stage), she has achieved her arrival. Her 
pregnancy here is situated as a pathway to success. An unsolicited comment follows: 
“You’re so lucky, Ali. Me, I’m just another white guy. But you are both a female and a 
minority” (her emphasis). Contrarily, Wong illustrates throughout her memoir just how 
untrue this assertion is: her status as both woman and minority, along with her pregnancy, 
have suggested that she does not arrive on the stage. Precisely the fact that she has been 
asked if her Otherness is “her thing” gestures toward the idea that she should not be there.  
The feeling that Wong should not be there is tied up with her success. Her fame 
came with the 2016 debut of her stand up special Baby Cobra, filmed when she was 7 ½  
months pregnant with her first child. In the special, Wong is hyper-aware of her pregnant 
state, beginning with the statement: “We’re going to have to get this shit over with, 
because I have to pee in like ten minutes” (Wong 2016). Wong, in a fitted dress that 
accentuated her rounded belly, proceeded into material ranging from her positive HPV 
status, sex, and defecation (among other subjects). Wong’s fitted dress is important to 
note because she provided visual aids through miming to her audience, at times fully on 
her back with her legs raised. Though pregnancy factors largely into her routine, Wong 
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expands her material to show the nuanced and uncomfortable experiences she’s had while 
emphasizing her background as an impetus for these events. More importantly, this 
background and collection of experience is presented as informing her comedic 
orientation: she is funny because her background is disoriented. In both Dear Girls and 
Baby Cobra, Wong’s identity as not only a woman, but an Asian American woman with 
Chinese and Vietnamese heritage, has directed both her experiences and her responses to 
them. Like Gadsby, Wong’s comedy works because she has a background, or a story to 
tell. The questions of Gadsby’s and Wong’s respective arrival to the stand-up stage is 
predicated on these stories, which in turn make up their backgrounds.  
 In this way, stand-up comedy can act as a form of memoir when comics center 
their background and personal experience in a manner that goes beyond entertainment 
towards other possible rhetorical functions. It is, after all, a genre that relies heavily on 
the personal anecdote, a story wherein an event happens involving the comedian 
themselves. They become the central narrator; we are presumed to be listening to a series 
of stories about their life or involving them, which in turn affect the way they inhabit and 
perceive the world. Gadsby comments on the small town: “I don’t feel comfortable in a 
small town. I get a bit tense” (Gasby 2018, my emphasis). Gadsby’s disorientation with 
the small town is due to her background there; the tension comes from a story or stories 
that involve her body and the space it inhabits. Throughout the entire special, in fact, the 
audience learns various facts and anecdotes about Gadsby’s life: where’s she’s from 
(Tanzania), her degree (Art History), and even tales of her history with comedy and her 
reception. Nanette is almost autobiographical. This technique, although not an unusual 
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approach taken by stand-up comedians, is deployed differently here: it is due to, rather 
than in spite of, Gadsby’s background that she is able to arrive on the stage.  
 However, comedy as memoir can and does take literal form: since the arrival of 
late-night television and comedy clubs, comedians have penned their lives’ tales and 
adventures. These memoirs operate differently from the stand-up set; they offer holistic, 
unusually chronological accounts of life (up to a certain point). Like the stand-up set, 
they are focused usually on either the comedian’s arrival on the stage or the condition of 
their inhabitance upon its arrival. In other words, these memoirs usually take place before 
or since one’s arrival, while stand-up sets may make sense of one’s presence through 
either their background or trajectory.  
The arrival on the stage is different than the inhabitance of the stage. Gadsby 
expresses the desire to “quit comedy” because the stage does not allow her to stretch out. 
She marks how the stage and the audience demand her to make light of her situation, to 
“release the tension” for them. However, in releasing tension for them she must hold 
tension in herself. The demand for one’s release is a denial of another’s. Gadsby tells us, 
“I need to tell my story properly,” implying that, for the sake of others, she has been 
demanded to ‘lose’ parts of it; those parts which make those around her uncomfortable.  
Conclusion 
 Though the initial engagement with and consumption of comedy has been 
understood as primarily entertainment, Wong, Haddish, Kaling, and Gadsby draw on the 
personal nature of the genre to disrupt its own shallow conventions and assumptions. 
These comics make moves that are simultaneously entertaining as well as rhetorical, 
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utilizing seemingly silly and laughable personal aspects and anecdotes as pathways to 
interrogate and dismantle their own otherness and provide uncomfortable engagements as 
well as unlikely identifications. By reading and watching their work in the framework of 
the theory of the rhetorical situation, I have put forth two claims: (1) that the comics take 
advantage of the comedic genre and its expectations in order to attend to their own 
otherness and disorientation on and off the stage; and (2) that the stand-up set itself 
generates a complex process of disorientation, where their inhabitance and agency 
disrupts the inhabitance and agency of the audience themselves.  
 The larger implications of framing comedy as both rhetorical and 
phenomenological are in how these comics’ disruptive and collaborative moves result in 
the spread of disorientation in a focused manner. Ahmed notes that not only can 
disorientation “move around,” but the state of being disoriented “requires an act of 
facing, but is a facing that also allows the object to slip away, or to become oblique” 
(171). The mere inhabitance of and ability to speak on the stage is only half of it: what is 
also important is how these comedians continually draw focus on themselves and their 
disorientation. In other words, they keep their audience facing them. In this way, the four 
comics maintain their disorientation and otherness, not in an attempt to alleviate or 
amend their situation (to make themselves “fit” better on the comedic stage), but to share 
these with their audience. By folding discomfort into laughter, they upset both the genre 
and the audience by focusing and refocusing on the situation at hand, rather than direct 
rhetorical action. This longer, hyper-focused meditation on disorientation and otherness 
refuses the immediate relief of tension as the end point and instead promotes a longer 
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engagement with the problem at hand—a problem articulated in and represented by their 
own bodies. 
 This thesis has been a short interrogation into what happens when comedy is 
generated and performed by those othered by the genre itself as well as in their everyday 
lives. When these comics take the stage, they prioritize their own embodied experiences 
and responses. What their inhabitance on the stage and what the further focus point on 
their otherness offers is a focus on what that otherness enacts and how it is felt on a 
personal level. Opportunities remain for additional examination of comedy not only as 
the spread of disorientation, but also the spread of bad feeling, or feeling uncomfortable, 
or simultaneously “left out” while also being the subject of conversation and scrutiny 
Where will feeling bad in funny or silly spaces lead us?    
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